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ABSTRACT 
Recent resurgence of interest in understanding the transmission mechanism of moneta ry  policy focuses 
on two main channels of explanation, i.e. the money and credit channel. This paper investigates a version 
of the credit channel, i.e. the bank-lending channel for the Malaysian economy. The bank-lending channel 
assigns a critical role for the supply of bank loans in transmitting the efect of moneta ry policy on real 
economic activities. The study analyzes the efect of monetary policy on the ability and willingness of 
Malaysian banks to issue loans with respect to the development in the open financial market. Specifically 
it argues on the changes of the pattern of influence as progress in the open financial market takes place. 
A multivariate system analysis of vector auto regression (VAR) is used. The results show that prior to the 
progress in open financial market, the monetary authority has a direct influence on supply of loans of 
banks. However, this direct influence lessens as the open financial market develops. Loans are moreafected 
by interest rates spread that dictates conditions in open financial markets. Thus, the ability of themoneta y 
authority to steer real economic activities is subjected to development in the financial market. 
ABSTRAK 
Terdapat dua pandangan utama yang diutarakan oleh penyelidik-penyelidik masa kini dalam 
membincangkan mekanisma saluran polisi monetari; iaitu mekanisma saluran wang dan kredit. Kertas 
kq ja  ini mengkaji satu versi mekanisma saluran kredit, iaitu mekanisma saluran pinjaman-bank. 
Mekanisme saluran pinjaman-bank menyatakan kepentingan peranan penawaran pinjaman bank dalam 
rnenyalurkan kesan polisi monetari terhadap aktiviti ekonomi benar. Kertas kerja ini menganalisis kesan 
polisi monetari terhadap keupayaan dan kerelaan bank-bank di Malaysia untuk memberi pinjaman 
berhubung dengan pembangunan pasaran kewangan terus. Secara spesifiknya, ia membincangkan 
pembahan-perubahan corak pengaruh polisi monetariapabila pasaran kewangan terus mula berkembang. 
Hasil kaedah sistem analisis pelbagai angkubah vektor autoregresi WAR) menunjukkan bahawa sebelum 
pembangunan pasaran kewangan terus, polisi monetari rnempunyai kesan langsung terhadap penawaran 
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pinjaman bank. Walau bagaimanapun, kesan langsung tersebut berkurangan apabila pasaran kewangan 
t m s  berkembang. Penawaran pinjaman bankdipengaruhioleh jurang kadar haedah yang menggambarkan 
keadaan dalam pasaran kewangan terus. Oleh itu, keupayaan pihak berkuasa rnonetari untuk mengawal 
arah aktiviti-aktiviti ekonomi benar adalah tertakluk kepada pembangunan pasaran kewangan. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent studies that investigate the impact of 
monetary policy on the economy have brought 
a resurgence of interest in understanding the 
channels through which the policy is 
transmitted into the economy. These studies 
generally focus on two main channels of 
explanation, i.e. the money channel and the credit 
channel. The traditionalmoney channel argues 
that money affects the economy directly via 
changes in open market interest rates, which 
influence final expenditures'. On the other 
hand, within the credit channel framework, 
the amount of credit available in the economy 
is the driving force of money non-neutrality in 
the short run2. Changes in monetary policy 
exert significant influence on the availability 
of credit in the economy and, this in turn 
affects the spending of firms and households. 
A version of &e credit channel, i.e. the 
bank-lending channel, suggests that changes in 
monetary policy affect availability of bank 
loans, and this in turn influences spending of 
economic agents that rely on funding sourced 
from banking institutions. This paper 
investigates the bank-lending channel in the 
Malaysian economy and focuses on the 
direction of influence of monetary policy on 
the amount of loans issued by commercial 
banks with respect to changes in financial 
environment. 
The following discussion is presented as 
follows. Section 2 describes the framework of 
credit and bank-lending channel. The 
methodology and data used are explained in 
Section 3. The empirical results are discussed 
in Section 4 and finally, Section 5 ends this 
paper with conclusions and implications. 
THE CREDIT CHANNEL AND THE 
BANK-LENDING CHANNEL 
The Credit Channel 
Interest in the credit view explanation of 
monetary transmission mechanism follows 
Bernanke's (1983) re-examination of economic 
downturn during the Great Depression era. It 
is shown that explanatory power of money- 
only equation in explaining the depth and 
persistence of recessions is enhanced by an 
additional explanatory variable that measures 
intermediated credit3. Supportive evidence 
on the importance of credit in explaining output 
variation is also shown by Bernanke (1986) 
and Bernanke and James (1991). Credit shocks 
are found to have an immediate and strong 
impact on output, lasting for a year or more4. 
Modification of the traditional IS-LM 
model by Bernanke and Blinder (1988), shows 
the building blocks of the credit channel 
framework. Based on this modified model, 
conditions in the credit markets are shown to 
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be an important source that can exert changes 
in real outputs. The credit channel as modeled 
by Bernanke and Blinder (1988) rests on three 
necessary conditions which later became the 
central issues in empirical and theoretical work 
on credit channel i.e., (i) Bank loans and open 
market credit must not be perfect substitutes, 
(ii) The monetary authority must be able to 
influence supply of bank loans and, (iii) 
Imperfect price adjustment. The first two 
conditions are specific for the credit channel. 
The last condition is a more general condition, 
which must also be true in the money channel 
in order for real output to be affected by changes 
in monetary policy6. 
The Bank-Lending Channel 
The bank-lending channel view arises from 
the first two conditions of the credit channel 
stated earlier. The first condition implies the 
existence of bank-dependent (i.e. economic units 
that heavily rely on bank financing) agents in 
the economy. The inability of bank-dependent 
group to obtain the needed financing from 
sources other than banks provides a special 
role for bank loans in transmitting monetary 
shock7. Various studies such as Gertler et. al. 
(1991), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Kashyap 
ef. al. (1993,1994),0her and Rudebusch (1996) 
show that bank-dependent agents are more 
sigruficantly affected by variations inmonetary 
policy. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) identify a 
differential impact of monetary policy on firms 
of different sizes. It is shown that the effect of 
monetary policy on small firms (bank- 
dependent) is larger when compared to large 
firms. Their findings reflect non-perfect 
substitute between banks and direct financing 
and also justify the differential impact of 
changes in monetary policy on bank and 
non-bank dependent borrowers8. Hoshi et.al. 
(1991) indicate that investment spending of 
Japanese firms that possess a special 
relationship with Japanese banks through 
formation of ’keiretsu’, i.e. industrial groups, 
are less vulnerable to economic downturn 
compared to non-keiretsu firms. 
The ability of the monetary authority to 
influence bank-lending capacity provides 
additional channel for monetary policy to affect 
real sector. Proponents of the bank-lending 
channel argue that non-neutrality of money in 
the short TUI~ significantly depend on how 
banks react to monetary policy9. Monetary 
equilibrium models developed by Fuerst (1994) 
and Labadie (1995) are consistent with the 
bank-lending channelview. The non-neutrality 
of money is shown to be dependent on reactions 
of commercial banks toward monetary 
changes. Both authors indicate that the 
economy will be stimulated only if loan supply 
of banks is affected. Thus, the efficacy of 
monetary policy to influence real activities in 
the short run requires the central bank’s ability 
to motivate banks to vary their lending 
activities. Thus, studying the behavior of bank 
lending toward changes in monetary policy is 
critical in understanding the mechanism of 
bank-lending channel. 
An important factor that influences the 
way bank lending reacts to monetary policy is 
the progress and development in open financial 
markets. Thornton (1994) identifies the 
weakening relationship between reserves and 
loans following the Monetary Control Act of 
1980. Loans and reserves are positively and 
sigruficantly associated for the pre-1980 period, 
but the significant link disappears after 1980. 
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Financial innovation and deregulation are 
argued to be the main factors behind this 
weakening relationship. Morris and Gordon 
(1995) also support the view that bank lending 
is not constrained by the availability of reserves. 
Keeton (1993) explains that a contraction in 
reserves might not lead to a reduction in bank 
loans but instead may result in increase in the 
issuance of non-deposit liabilities and/or 
liquidation of securities held; thus, this impedes 
the effects of monetary contraction. Romer 
and Romer (1990) argue that banks resorted to 
CDs financing when monetary policy is 
contracted. They note that the spread between 
interest rates on CDs and commercial paper 
increases as tight monetary policy occurs. This 
scenario suggests that banks attempt to insulate 
their loan portfolios from declining by issuing 
new CDs. 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1993), Kashyap and Stein (1995), 
and McMillin (1996) all indicate the lagged 
effects of bank loans after monetary 
contraction10. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
indicate that when the Fed tightens money 
supply, bank deposits and securities fall 
immediately, but bank loans decline gradually 
after some lag. This supports the view that 
banks shield the; loan portfolios via security 
liquidation and sourcing borrowed liabilities. 
Thus, financial liberalization and innovation 
can exert sigruficant influence on behavior of 
banks toward policies implemented by 
monetary authorityll. 
Studies cited in preceding paragraphs 
imply that there are two possible channels of 
influence that can effect bank lending by 
changes in monetary condition; i.e. the direct 
influence and indirect inpuence (Morgan, 1992). 
A direct influence arises from the ability of 
central banks to influence the capability of 
banking firms to issue loans by limiting the 
availability of loanable funds. As an example, 
monetary contraction that leads to reduction 
in liabilities of banks (through the reduction in 
total reserves) reduces the ability of banks to 
issue new loans. Limited loanable funds 
available from banking firms adversely affect 
spending of bank-dependent agents; thus, it 
contributes to economic slowdown. 
The indirect effect is a result of the 
influence of monetary policy on open market 
interest rates1*. This effect resolves adverse 
selection problems faced by banking firms, 
following monetary contractions. Higher open 
market rates due to monetary contraction push 
some of the 'high-risk' borrowers (i.e. 
borrowers whose default premiums increase 
during economic slowdown) to source their 
needs for credits from banking firms. In 
reaction to the increases in 'high-risk' 
borrowers, banks increase their lending rate 
during monetary contraction, thus reducing 
loans is~uance'~. The two channels of influence, 
the direct and indirect effect, explain the 
reactions of banks toward monetary policy. 
Understanding the way monetary policy 
influences bank-lending behavior is critical 
for effective evaluation of the bank-lending 
channel. 
This study investigates the mechanism of 
the bank-lending channel in a developing 
economy using Malaysia as an example. 
Existing studies, which investigate this issue, 
are largely focused onunited States of America 
and other developed westernnations. Evidence 
from developing countries such as Malaysia is 
still quite limited. Analyzing the bank lending 
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channel hypothesis in a developing economy 
is of interest for anwnber of reasons. Economic 
characteristics of developing nations are more 
likely to meet the necessary conditions of the 
credit channel explained earlier. Market 
imperfections (limited accessibility to external 
open market financing) lead to the presence of 
large groups of bank-dependent agents in a 
developing economy; therefore, increasing the 
signlficance of the bank lending channel. In 
addition, evolution of banking practices in 
these countries could affect the way monetary 
policy exerts its effect on bank lending 
behavior. The process of financial 
liberalization, innovation and 
internationalization of financial markets that 
have occured in the nineties could have 
changed the ability of the central bank to 
influence banks’ loans portfolio14. 
Table 1, on page 124, tabulates the 
amount of funds raised in the Malaysian 
capital market (equity and debt) vis-8-vis the 
amount of bank loans from 1980 to 1999. The 
significant development of the open financial 
market as indicated by the large increase in 
the total amount sourced from capital market 
(column 5 )  with approximately 270 percent 
increase between ,the first (1980-1989) and 
second sub-periods (1990-1999). A more 
significant development is recorded for 
private debt market (column 2). This large 
growth in the open debt market enhances the 
indirect effect of the bank-lending channel. In 
the first sub-period, the amount of private 
debt sourced from the open financial market 
is negligible, averaging at around RM478 
million a year. However, the second sub- 
period witnessed a large increase in the yearly 
average of private debt sourced from the 
open financial market reaching about 
RM10,499 million per year. 
Efforts to promote the Malaysian private 
debt market materialized in the second sub- 
period. Nevertheless, bankloans still dominate 
the amount of credit issued in the Malaysian 
economy. In the second sub-period, bank 
loans represented about 91 percent of the total 
credit issued, a slight increase compared to 
about 88 percent in the earlier sub-period. 
Throughout the whole period, bank loans 
represented approximately 90 percent of the 
total credit issued. Thus, increasing the 
significance of bank-lending channel in 
explaining transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in Malaysia. This paper 
evaluates the two channels of influence of 
monetary policy on bank-lending activity 
described earlier, i.e. the direct and indirect 
efect. This paper analyzes the reaction of banks’ 
loans to changes in the monetary policy with 
respect to development in the Malaysian 
financial market. 
DATA SET AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
Monthly observations of the following time 
series are gathered from the Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin of Bank Negara Malaysia (the Central 
Bank of Malaysia); money supply (Ml), 
demand deposits held by commercial banks 
(DD), total reserves (TR), Industrial Production 
Index (IPI), Consumer Price Index (CPI), 3- 
months T-bills rate (TB3M), average lending 
rate by commercial banks (ALR), and total 
loans issued by commercial banks (LOAN). 
The data set begins from 1983:l to 1999:12. 
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Table 1 
knds Raised in Capital Market and Bank Loans (RM Million) 
Public Debt 
(3) 
Total Funds 
(8) = (5 )  + (6)  
Year Equity 
(1) 
Private Debt 
(2) 
Total Debt 
(4) = (2) + (3) 
Total Capital Market 
(5)  = (1) + (4) 
Bank Loans 
(6) 
Total Credit 
(7) = (4) + (6) 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
137 
902 
629 
1262 
1972 
645 
189 
1385 
931 
2508 
8650 
4391 
9182 
3433 
8458 
11438 
15924 
18358 
1788 
6087 
20 
0 
50 
137 
392 
0 
0 
395 
1881 
1904 
2603 
2146 
4384 
5014 
10266 
12223 
17049 
19597 
14152 
17553 
3266 
4665 
6571 
4297 
4081 
4980 
5622 
8672 
8982 
3913 
5441 
3800 
4300 
3748 
5500 
2750 
6000 
3794 
17682 
14975 
3286 
4665 
6621 
4434 
4473 
4980 
5622 
9067 
10862 
5816 
8043 
5946 
8684 
8762 
15766 
14973 
23049 
23391 
31834 
32529 
3423 
5567 
7250 
5696 
6445 
5625 
5811 
10452 
11794 
8325 
16693 
10338 
17865 
12195 
24224 
26410 
38973 
41750 
33621 
38615 
20872 
25521 
29666 
36053 
43504 
48982 
52329 
52181 
56432 
67142 
80758 
97206 
105721 
117236 
134151 
175007 
217821 
276285 
285676 
283231 
24154 
30186 
36287 
40487 
47977 
53962 
57951 
61248 
67295 
72958 
88801 
103152 
114404 
125998 
149917 
189980 
240689 
299677 
317510 
315760 
24295 
31088 
36915 
41749 
49950 
54606 
58139 
62633 
68226 
75466 
97451 
107544 
123586 
129430 
158375 
201418 
256794 
318035 
319298 
321846 
tearlv average 
~ 
478 
10499 
5488 
2097 
.981- 89 
1990 - 99 
.980 - 99 
1056 
8771 
4913 
73 1 
5505 
6799 
6152 
24 
5983 
17298 
7039 43251 
177309 
110289 
310 
1 
49251 
194607 
121929 
50307 
203378 
126842 
304 
26068 
~~ 
16554 
270 
11640 
189 295 
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin Bank Negara Malaysia 
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The empirical analysis conducted in this 
study is based on a vector auto regression 
(VAR) methodology introduced by Sims 
(1980). Tkus method involves simultaneous 
estimations of variables, which affect each 
other in an autoregressive pattern. A vector of 
m variables X, = (xl,, x2, ....., xmt)’ can be 
represented in a VAR system as follows: 
where A is a rn x m matrix of impact multipli- 
ers, B(L) is a k*-order matrix of structural 
polynomials in the lag operator L, B(L) = BIL + 
B2L2 + ...... + B,Lk, v, is a m x 1 vector of 
structural disturbances with zero mean, E [U,] 
= 0, and covariance matrix Su = E[u, ut’] for all 
t, and the u,’s are serially ~ncorrelatedl~. Two 
forms of analysis of the VAR estimations are 
presented, i.e. the static Granger causality 
(Granger (1969)) and the variance decomposi- 
tion analysis16. 
Three sets of data are used in this paper. 
The first set of data (Sub-period I) begins from 
1983:l to 1989:12. This period reflects theyears 
prior to the development of the Malaysian 
financial market. The next set of data (Sub- 
period 11) reflects financial development years 
that witnessed rapid progress and 
development of an open financial market, i.e. 
199O:l-1999:12. The analysis for the whole 
period (Full-period), covering the seventeen 
years period, i.e. 1983:l - 1999:12 is also 
performed. A five-variable VAR system is 
estimated involving the following variables 
according to their ordering; monetary 
indicator, output, prices, interest rates spread, 
and 10an17. Three different proxies for monetary 
indicators (M1 money, demand deposits, and 
total reserves) are employed1*. The direct effect 
of the bank-lending channel is reflected by the 
effect of monetary indicator on the amount of 
loans issued by commercial banks. The indirect 
effect of the bank-lending channel is reflected 
by interest rates spread, i.e. the difference 
between the ALR and 3-month Treasury bills 
ratelg. The development of the open financial 
market increases the importance of indirect 
effect of the bank-lending view. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2,3a, 3b, and 3c, on the following pages, 
provide the results of the VAR analysis. The 
results for the loan’s equation characterize the 
reaction of loans with respect to changes in 
monetary policy. Monetary policy affects bank 
loans through the direct effect (monetary 
indicator) and indirect effect (interest rate 
spread). Table 2, on page 126, shows the F- 
statistics that justify the signlficance of lagged 
coefficients of monetary indicators and interest 
rates spread in the loan equations. 
The F-statistics examines the null 
hypothesis, which states that lagged 
coefficients of the independent variable are all 
equal to zero. Rejecting the null hypothesis 
indicates that the variable tested contributes a 
significant change in loan issuance. The direct 
effect of monetary policy on bank loans is 
shown to be an important explanation during 
the first sub-period. Two of the three monetary 
indicators (M1 money and demand deposit) 
significantly caused changes in loan issuances 
while all other variables are not sigruficantly 
different from zero20. However, the importance 
of the direct effect diminishes when the data 
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are limited to the second sub-period (financial 
development years). The same is true when 
the full period data set is employed. The ability 
of monetary authority to influence loan 
issuances is no longer direct. The results show 
that the indirect effect has replaced the direct 
effect. All of the coefficients for lagged interest 
rates spread are signlficantly different from 
zero for the second sub-period and full period 
of the monetary indicator used. The 
significance level is high for all of the 
estimations. Thus, development in open 
financial markets changes the way banks react 
to monetary policy. During a period of 
monetary contraction, banks cut their loans in 
reaction toward the influx of high-risk 
borrowers demanding loans from banking 
institutions. This, strengthens the indirect effect 
analysis. This sigruficance remains, regardless of bank-lending channel. 
Table 2 
The F-Statistics for Granger Causality Test 
I
Null Hypothesis: 
Money does not influence total loans 
Monetary Indicator: 
M1- Money 
Demand Deposit 
Total Reserves 
Null H othesis: 
Spread YB oes not influance total loans 
Monetary Indicator: 
M1- Money 
Demand Deposit 
Total Reserves 
Sub-period I 
(1983~1- 989~12) 
2.861"" 
(0.031) 
3.502"" 
(0 .O 13) 
1.166 
(0.335) 
1.330 
(0.270) 
0.903 
(0.468) 
1.593 
(0.188) 
Sub-period I T  
(19901 - 1992:12) 
1.481 
(0.214) 
0.703 
(0.592) 
0.177 
(0.950) 
3.162"" 
(0.017) 
(0.011) 
3.444"" 
3.095 ** 
(0.019) 
Full-period 
(1983:1-1999:12 
1.805 
(0.130) 
1.197 
(0.314) 
0.619 
(0.650) 
4.752"" 
(0.001) 
(0.001) 
4.737"" 
(0.00) 
5.082 
Notes: 
1. The reported figures of the F-statistics for the null hypothesis show that all lagged terms of 
the monetary indicators (or interest rates spread) are equal to zero. The P-values are in 
parentheses. These are derived from the VARestimations involving four variables (Monetary 
mdicator, output, prices, interest rates spread, loans). Rejection of the null hypothesis 
supports causation from the monetary indicator (or interest rates spread) to total loans. 
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The second evidence that supports the 
strengthening of the indirect effect is the vari- 
ance decomposition analysis (VDA). The de- 
composition of variations in bank loans are 
shown in Table 3a, 3b and 3c, on the following 
pages. These tables report the decomposition 
of the variance of loans derived from the VAR 
analysis that used M1 Money, Demand De- 
posits, and Total Reserves, as monetary indi- 
cators respectively. The variance of total loans 
that is due to monetary indicator and interest 
rates spread is shown to measure the direct 
and indirect effect of bank-lending channel. 
Results for the first sub-period (first column of 
Table 3a, 3b, and 3c) support the strength of 
the direct effect of the bank-lending channelz1. 
In the first sub-period, monetary indicators 
affect bank loans more significantly as com- 
pared to interest rates spread. The average 
proportion of loan variance explained is ap- 
proximately 20.4, and 15.3 percent for M1 
money and demand deposits respectively. 
Table 3a 
Variance Decomposition Analysis for Total Loans (Monetary Indicator : M1 Money) 
~ 
Step 
- 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Sub-period I 
(1983~1- 1989~12) 
Std. 
Error 
0.94 
1.01 
1.08 
1.11 
1.15 
1.15 
1.18 
1.19 
1.20 
1.20 
1.21 
1.22 
1.23 
1.24 
1.25 
1.25 
1.26 
1.27 
1.27 
1.28 
1.28 
1.29 
1.29 
1.30 
_ _ _ ~  
M1 
Money 
16.56 
19.39 
17.40 
19.69 
19.42 
19.26 
19.42 
19.47 
20.05 
20.16 
20.79 
20.84 
20.97 
21.23 
21.26 
21.36 
21.37 
21.44 
21.43 
21.47 
21.47 
21.47 
21.47 
21.48 
Spread 
1.07 
1.58 
1.85 
1.77 
5.18 
5.70 
6.96 
6.87 
6.76 
6.89 
6.81 
6.73 
6.76 
6.67 
6.59 
6.51 
6.46 
6.39 
6.35 
6.29 
6.24 
6.20 
6.16 
6.13 
~~ 
Sub-period I1 
(1990~1- 1999~12) 
Std. 
Error 
1.30 
1.33 
1.40 
1.43 
1.52 
1.53 
1.54 
1.55 
1.56 
1.57 
1.58 
1.59 
1.59 
1.60 
1.60 
1.60 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
M1 
Money 
17.65 
16.95 
16.36 
15.89 
14.08 
14.11 
14.07 
15.32 
15.67 
16.39 
16.63 
17.15 
17.34 
17.68 
17.91 
18.10 
18.25 
18.34 
18.42 
18.46 
18.49 
18.49 
18.50 
18.49 
Spread 
3.09 
5.07 
11.92 
14.00 
14.53 
14.36 
14.57 
14.41 
14.25 
14.14 
14.06 
13.93 
13.84 
13.74 
13.68 
13.62 
13.57 
13.54 
13.51 
13.50 
13.48 
13.48 
13.47 
13.46 
Full-period 
(1983~1- 1999~12) 
Std. 
Error 
1.29 
1.31 
1.35 
1.38 
1.43 
1.43 
1.43 
1.44 
1.45 
1.45 
1.46 
1.47 
1.47 
1.48 
1.48 
1.49 
1.49 
1.49 
1.49 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
M1 
Money 
17.04 
16.69 
15.78 
15.49 
14.63 
14.92 
15.33 
15.88 
16.35 
16.88 
17.44 
17.91 
18.28 
18.63 
18.91 
19.16 
19.36 
19.51 
19.63 
19.73 
19.81 
19.87 
19.91 
19.94 
Spread 
0.97 
2.43 
5.86 
7.13 
11.02 
11 .oo 
10.95 
10.87 
10.78 
10.69 
10.60 
10.53 
10.45 
10.38 
10.32 
10.27 
10.23 
10.19 
10.16 
10.14 
10.12 
10.10 
10.10 
10.09 
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On the other hand, interest rates spread 
explains only about 5.6, and 5.0 percent of 
variance of bank loans in the first sub-period. 
Thus, changes in monetary policy affect bank 
loans directly during the pre-development 
years. 
Table 3b 
Variance Decomposition Analysis for Total Loans (Monetary Indicator : Demand Deposit) 
Step 
- 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 . 
22 
23 
24 - 
Sub-period I 
(1983~1- 1989:12) 
Std. 
Error 
0.92 
1.97 
1.06 
1.09 
1.13 
1.14 
1.17 
1.20 
1.20 
1.21 
1.23 
1.24 
1.25 
1.26 
1.27 
1.28 
1.28 
1.29 
1.30 
1.30 
1.31 
1.31 
1.31 
1.32 
Demand 
Deposits 
3.64 
3.28 
11.51 
11.88 
11.76 
12.83 
13.58 
14.26 
14.80 
16.20 
16.96 
17.43 
18.00 
18.52 
18.78 
19.02 
19.20 
19.31 
19.39 
19.43 
19.47 
19.48 
19.48 
19149 
Spread 
1.52 
1.41 
1.53 
1.44 
4.32 
4.63 
6.52 
6.37 
6.33 
6.27 
6.18 
6.07 
5.99 
5.90 
5.80 
5.73 
5.67 
5.61 
5.57 
5.54 
5.50 
5.48 
5.45 
5.44 
Sub-period I1 
(199O:l- 1999~12) 
Std. 
Error 
1.32 
1.35 
1.41 
1.45 
1.53 
1.54 
1.55 
1.56 
1.57 
1.58 
1.58 
1.59 
1.59 
1.60 
1.60 
1.60 
1.60 
1.60 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
Demand 
Deposits 
10.51 
10.06 
9.36 
8.99 
8.21 
8.31 
8.28 
9.11 
9.25 
9.79 
9.97 
10.24 
10.36 
10.48 
10.63 
10.70 
10.78 
10.80 
10.82 
10.82 
10.82 
10.81 
10.80 
10.80 
Spread 
2.58 
4.70 
11.65 
14.04 
14.71 
14.53 
14.73 
14.66 
14.54 
14.44 
14.38 
14.28 
14.20 
14.11 
14.07 
14.03 
14.00 
13.98 
13.96 
13.96 
13.95 
13.95 
13.95 
13.95 
Full-period 
(1983:l- 1999:12) 
Std. 
Error 
1.30 
1.32 
1.36 
1.39 
1.44 
1.44 
1.45 
1.45 
1.46 
1.46 
1.47 
1.47 
1.48 
1.48 
1.48 
1.49 
1.49 
1.49 
1.49 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
Demand 
Deposits 
8.07 
7.82 
7.36 
7.67 
7.18 
7.58 
8.00 
8.45 
8.94 
9.54 
10.10 
10.59 
10.97 
11.31 
11.58 
11.79 
11.95 
12.06 
12.13 
12.18 
12.21 
12.22 
12.23 
12.22 
Spread 
1.22 
2.78 
6.46 
7.89 
11.97 
11.96 
11.90 
11.84 
11.81 
11.72 
11.64 
11.57 
11.50 
11.43 
11.38 
11.35 
11.32 
11.29 
11.27 
11.26 
11.25 
11.25 
11.24 
11.24 
The variance decomposition analysis also and demand deposits are used as monetary 
indicates that the indirect effect strengthens as 
the economy moves into the second sub-pe- 
riod (financial development years). The per- 
centage of loan variance that can be explained 
by interest rates spread increased sharply. 
Compared to the first sub-period, the contri- 
bution of interest rates spread increased from 
an average of 5.3 percent (when M1 money 
indicators) to 13.1 percent. The strengthening 
of the indirect channel is greater when de- 
mand deposits are used as monetary indicator 
(Table 3b). Prior to the development in the 
open financial market, demand deposits (the 
direct effect) contribute to about 15.3 percent 
of variance in loan. However, this contribu- 
tion dropped to about 10.0 percent as financial 
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market developed. The reverse is true for the 
influence of interest rates spread. This is espe- 
cially true for the immediate months. The 
effect of interest rates spread peaks at around 
8 months and faded thereafter. 
The VDA indicates that loans issuance is 
less tied to its money liability. The influence of 
open market rates onvariance of loan is greater 
than the influence of demand deposits. There- 
fore, the ability of the central bank to influence 
reservable deposits does not give additional 
advantage for the monetary authority to influ- 
ence bank loans. As the open financial market 
develops, the market condition exerts greater 
influence on the issuance of loans by Malaysian 
banks. With the development of financial mar- 
kets, private banking institutions have wider 
choices in their decisions. 
Table 3c 
Variance Decomposition Analysis for Total Loans (Monetary Indicator : Total Reserves) 
- 
- 
Step 
- 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
- 
Sub-period I 
(1983:l- 1989:lZ) 
Std. 
Error 
0.99 
1.03 
1.10 
1.14 
1.20 
1.21 
1.23 
1.25 
1.26 
1.27 
1.28 
1.29 
1.30 
1.31 
1.33 
1.34 
1.35 
1.37 
1.30 
1.41 
1.43 
1.45 
1.48 
1.50 
Total 
Reserves 
0.07 
2.07 
4.06 
3.86 
4.55 
4.8 
4.71 
5.33 
5.72 
6.28 
6.83 
7.62 
8.46 
9.36 
10.38 
11\50 
12.60 
13.79 
15.06 
16.36 
17.69 
19.07 
20.51 
21.95 
Spread 
6.52 
7.54 
6.79 
7.18 
13.98 
13.93 
15.46 
12.06 
15.91 
15.74 
16.00 
16.03 
15.96 
15.95 
15.99 
16.02 
15.94 
15.99 
15.98 
16.00 
15.97 
15.99 
15.96 
15.95 
Sub-period I1 
(1990:l- 1999:12) 
Std. 
Error 
1.33 
1.36 
1.42 
1.45 
1.53 
1.54 
1.54 
1.55 
1.57 
1.58 
1.59 
1.60 
1.60 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.61 
1.62 
Total 
Reserves 
0.11 
0.11 
0.10 
0.81 
0.74 
0.73 
0.74 
1.45 
2.50 
3.07 
3.69 
4.28 
4.65 
4.99 
5.19 
5.28 
5.31 
3.52 
5.32 
5.32 
5.33 
5.36 
5.39 
5.43 
Spread 
1.48 
2.77 
9.23 
11.04 
11.70 
11.60 
11.74 
11.82 
11.71 
11.68 
11.57 
11.46 
11.39 
11.31 
11.27 
11.25 
11.24 
11.23 
11.23 
11.23 
11.23 
11.22 
11.21 
11.20 
Full-period 
(1983~1- 1999~12) 
Std. 
Error 
1.31 
1.32 
1.37 
1.40 
1.45 
1.46 
1.46 
1.46 
1.47 
1.47 
1.48 
1.48 
1.49 
1.49 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
Total 
Reserves 
0.00 
0.11 
0.41 
1 .oo 
1.04 
1.12 
1.12 
1.37 
1.86 
2.25 
2.77 
3.25 
3.67 
4.03 
4.33 
4.55 
4.70 
4.80 
4.87 
4.91 
4.93 
4.94 
4.94 
4.94 
Spread 
1.06 
2.27 
6.14 
7.59 
11.48 
11.57 
11.55 
11.54 
11.54 
11.49 
11.40 
11.34 
11.27 
11.22 
11.18 
11.14 
11.12 
11.10 
11.09 
11.09 
11.09 
11.08 
11.08 
11.08 
Under certain circumstances, private profit monetary institutions. Therefore, 
maximizing objectives can override national understanding the banking behavior with 
goals, which underlie the setting up of national respect to advancement in the financial market 
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remains as an  important interest for current 
researchers. As pointed by Fuesrt (1994, pp. 
375) “Since banks appear to be the conduit for these 
(monetary) injections, one could say that we need 
more banking theo y in moneta ry theory. ’’ 
CONCLUSIONS 
Understanding the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy is crucial in the evaluating 
theeffectiveness of monetary policy. This paper 
investigates a version of the credit channel 
view, i.e. the bank-lending channel. The bank- 
lending channel assigns a critical role for bank 
lending behavior in transmitting the effect of 
monetary policy on real activities. This paper 
analyzes the bank-lending channel for the 
Malaysian economy, a small economy that 
displays sigruficant dependence onbankcredit. 
The analysis focuses on the effects of 
development in the open financial market on 
bank-lending channel. The results show that 
prior to development of the open financial 
market (1983-1989), the direct effect of monetary 
policy on bank loans dominates, and variation 
in the amount of monetary aggregate exerts 
direct influence on bank loans issuance. 
However, as the open financial market 
developed (199O-1999), the direct effect reduces. 
Theimportance of the indirect effect, originating 
from the open financial market (proxied by the 
interest rates spread), increases. Banks are 
shown to take into account, the development of 
the open financial market in determining loans 
issuance. The direct influence of the monetary 
authority on bank loans is lessened by the 
development in the open financial market. In 
an adverse situation, there is a possibility that 
\ 
the lending behavior of a bank is strictly 
directed by their profit objectives rather than 
the social objectives of the monetary authority. 
Thus, the phenomena of banking pessimism, 
where bank lending is shielded from monetary 
policy during economic slowdown, suggests a 
tougher task for the monetary authority to 
influence real activities. 
ENDNOTES 
The sensitivity of investment expenditures 
toward changes in the level of interest rates 
is a critical element that allows money to 
have real effect. Keynes’ (1936) ‘animal spirit’ 
doubts that interest rate variations have a 
predictable impact on investments spending 
of firms. Hirtle and Kelleher (1990) provide 
evidence that challenge the sensitivity of 
investment toward interest rates changes. 
* The credit channel view does not in anyway 
reject the money channel explanation. In- 
stead, the credit channel is proposed as an 
explanation that enhance the understand- 
ing of how money affects the economy. The 
debate centers on the relative important of 
each channel. Earlier views of the credit 
channel can be found in Roosa (1951), 
Brunner and Meltzer (1963), and Tobin and 
Brainard (1963), Bernanke (1986). See 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) for compre- 
hensive explanation on the role of credit and 
Bernanke and Mark (1995) for overview of 
the credit channel. 
Drastic decline in the availability of 
intermediated credit, i.e. the credit crunch, 
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exerts significant influence on the economic 
performance. Bernanke and Lown (1992) 
examine the episode of credit crunch in the 
early 90’s recession in the United States. 
Credit crunch is also evident in the recent 
East Asia crisis where a cut down in bank 
lending dragged the East Asian economies 
into deep recession. (Bank Negara Malay- 
sia, 1998). 
Bernanke and James (1991) provide interna- 
tional evidence favouring the credit chan- 
nel. They argue that financial distress (i.e. 
the inability to access new credit and the 
weakening financial positions of bank) im- 
pose deadweight losses on the economy. 
The regression results indicate that the 
PANIC variables (i.e. period of serious bank- 
ing problems) are sigruficantly different from 
zero. The effect of banking panics on output 
is considerable . 
In addition to the modified IS-LM model, 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) also provide 
empirical evidence on the important of 
credit cycle. They analyze the money and 
credit demand functions for two 
sub-periods; 1974:l-1979:3 and 
1979:4-1985:4. The evidencAsuggests that 
money demand shock is smaller than credit 
demand in the first sub-period. However, 
for the second sub-period this is reversed. 
The lower credit demand shock in the sec- 
ond sub-period is consistent with credit 
targeting. 
Comprehensive discussion of these neces- 
sary conditions is provided by Kashyap and 
Stein (1994,1995). 
This also indirectly supports the view that 
banking firms are special. Modern explana- 
tions on the justification for the existence of 
banks are given by Diamond (1984), 
Ramakrrshnan and Thakor (1984) and M e n  
and Santomero (1998). This studies conclude 
that banks play a critical role whichcannot be 
performed individually in the direct finan- 
cial market. These explanations reject Fama 
(1980) views that banks are not special. This 
also implies the breakdown of the Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) capital structure irrelevance 
hypothesis. For the bank-dependent agents, 
bank financing is irreplaceable by direct fi- 
nancing from the open market. 
Elliehausen and Wolken (1990), and Petersen 
and Rajan (1992) provide evidence of 
bankdependence among small firms. 
This is in line with Bernanke’s (1983) re- 
evaluation of the great depression which 
claims the importance of intermediated 
credit in explaining economic cycles as ad- 
dition to monetary variables. 
l0 The decline in bank loans also varies accord- 
ing to the types of loans (Gertler and Gilchrist, 
1993) and the size of banks (Kashyap and 
Stein, 1995). 
l1 In a similar framework, Kashyap and Stein 
(1995) analyze the response of banks varying 
in size to monetary shocks based on bank 
profit maximizing behavior. It is shown that 
from small banks loans decline more sigrufi- 
cantly than those of the larger banks when- 
ever tight money policy is implemented. On 
the other hand, small banks’ securities hold- 
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ings respond sigruficantly less than large 
banks’ to monetary tightening. Thus, differ- 
ences in bank response may also be due to 
market imperfection, which affect the banks’ 
ability to shield their loan portfolios. 
l2 The indirect effect of the bank-lending chan- 
nel view is partly related to the mechanism 
of money channel. However, they are not 
the same. Changes in the level of open mar- 
ket interest rates (a money channel condi- 
tion) exert influence on the banking lending 
activities through asymmetry information 
and adverse selection problems. Inability to 
discriminate good and bad borrowers (due 
to the influx of borrowers who cannot bor- 
row from open financial market) causes 
banks to be more selective in lending follow- 
ing monetary contraction. Exemphfying the 
credit channel effect. 
l3 The reactions of banks to reduce loans issu- 
ance in such a situation can also be ex- 
plained based on a credit rationing model 
of Jaffea and Russell(l976) and Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981). Credit rationing adds to the 
importance of credit channel but it is not a 
necessary condition for the channel to be 
valid. 
\ 
l4 Ghazali (1999,2000) shows that liberalization 
and innovation that have taken place in Ma- 
laysia change the reactions of bank balance 
sheets components to monetary policy. De- 
velopment in financial market changes the 
balance sheets component of Malaysian com- 
mercial banks. This is especially true for the 
sources of funds for banks where traditional 
deposits (demand deposits) is being replaced 
significantly by competitive liabilities, i.e. 
funds which are not directly controlled by 
the central bank. Banks are shown to resort 
to competitive liabilities and securities liq- 
uidation to shield their lending capacity. 
l5 Prior to the VAR estimation we performed 
the stationarity testbased on the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test [Dickey and Fuller 
(1979,1981)l on all the series compiled. The 
results indicate that all the series are first 
difference stationary except for total loan 
and inflation rate, which require second 
difference. The VAR analysis is performed 
using stationary series adjusted based on 
the ADF test. We do not report this in our 
paper since this is now a standard proce- 
dure. The results are available upon request 
from the author. 
Description of the VAR analysis can be found 
in Enders (1995). The estimation procedure 
of VAR is simplified by the autoregressive 
specification. Since all of the right-hand-side 
variables are predetermined and the same 
foreachequation,ordinaryleastsquare (OLS) 
yields a consistent and asymptotically effi- 
cient estimator. Seemingly unrelated regres- 
sion (SUR) does not add to the efficiency of 
the estimation because of the identical re- 
gressors. The lag length is chosen by mini- 
mizingthefiaike’s AIC followingLutkepohl 
(1982). Assigning last ordering rank for the 
total loan implies that loans issuance react 
contemporaneously to changes in all other 
variables but its effect on all other variables 
come after some lag. Interest rates spread 
also reacts in the same manner with respect to 
monetary indicator, output and prices. 
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The VAR system employed in this study is 
similar to Bernanke and Blinder (1992), 
McMilh (1W6), and Ghazali and Kim( 1999) 
except that we use less variables in the 
system since our analysis only investigates 
loan portfolios. Bernanke and Blinder, 
McMillin, and Ghazali and Kim study the 
reactions of other banks’ balance sheets 
components tomonetary policy. Weinclude 
the output and inflationvariables to capture 
the aggregate demand effect on loan 
issuance. 
The choice of variable to be used as correct 
identification of monetary innovations is 
by itself subject to debate. See King and 
Plosser (1984), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), 
Friedmand and Kuttner (1992), 
Eichenbaum (1992), and Strongin (1995) 
for discussions on the use of interest rates, 
monetary aggregates, and non-borrowed 
reserves as monetary indicator. A group of 
researchers apply a dating procedure to 
measure monetary policy (see Romer and 
Romer (1990), Boschen and Mills (1992), 
and Morris and Sellon (1995)). This method 
identifies changes in monetary policy 
through a ’date’ that signifies Fed’s policy. 
The choice of monetary indicators for the 
Malaysian economy is limited by the avail- 
ability of data. We alsonote that the amount 
of total reserves (TR) for the eighties is not 
reported explicitly in the Monthly Statisti- 
cal Bulletin of the central bank. Data for 
total reserves is derived by this author after 
some re-arrangement of reports. 
As discussed by Morgan (1992), the spread 
between bank lending rates and the open 
market interest rates reflect the indirect 
channel of bank-lending. We use the 
difference between ALR and the 3- month 
Treasury bill rate in this study to capture 
the indirect effect of the bank-lending 
channel. Several interest rate spread 
measures have been used in previous 
studies. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) use 
the difference between the fed fund rate 
and the 10-year Treasury bond rate as a 
spread in their VARestimation. Kashyap et 
al. (1993,1994), and McMillin (1996) use the 
difference between prime rate and 
commercial paper rate. 
2o Our results are not significant when the total 
reserves are used as the monetary indicator. 
These insignificant results suggest that bank 
lending is not linked to the amount of total 
reserves in the banking system. 
*l Similar to the causality test (Table 2), the 
W A  results also could not support the im- 
portant role for the total reserves in influ- 
encing bank loans. Nevertheless, the impor- 
tance of interest rates spread is supported in 
line with other monetary indicators. We omit 
the results from Table 3c when comparing 
the strength of direct and indirect channel 
between the two sub-periods since this dis- 
torts our conclusions. 
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